


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The President's Daily Brief



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

August 14, 1974

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Turkish forces began a new offensive in Cyprus at dawn today, following the breakdown of the Geneva talks last night. As a consequence, Athens announced that it was withdrawing from military participation in NATO. (Page 1)

Our assessment as of yesterday afternoon of Turkish military capabilities on Cyprus appears on Page 2.

On Page 4 we discuss reaction in China and Japan to your assumption of office and the impact the change of administration may have on General Secretary Brezhnev's standing with his colleagues in the Soviet leadership.

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Syria

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Soviet officials, still concerned about the fate of the Soviet helicopter crew captured by the Chinese last March, were recently considering a new proposal to Peking to secure their release.

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Panama

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Cuba.

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
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TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS

Turkish forces began a new offensive in Cyprus at dawn today, following the breakdown of the Geneva talks last night. As a consequence, Athens announced that it was withdrawing from military participation in NATO.

The Turks launched air strikes against Nicosia airport and Greek positions south of the city. There also was sporadic fighting all along the line separating the Turkish and Greek communities in the capital. Initial reports of ground action indicate that the Turks are moving to relieve a Turkish Cypriot enclave near Chatos and that there is new fighting at the western end of the Kyrenia mountain range.

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The Greek government's decision to withdraw from military participation in NATO, while remaining a member of the Alliance, was apparently taken at an early morning emergency meeting of the country's top political and military leaders.

In New York, the UN Security Council held an emergency session early today to discuss the breakdown of the Geneva talks and the renewal of fighting in Cyprus. The meeting was called by British Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

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TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES ON CYPRUS

The Turks can, with the forces presently available to them on Cyprus, establish within three to six days a line of control across the island to include the "one third" of its territory that they have envisaged as an essentially Turkish area. Fighting would go on behind this line for some time, as pockets of Greek Cypriot resistance were cleared up. The Turks could bring in reinforcements, but these would not be essential for their immediate objectives. We define these objectives as the establishment of a line from Morphou to Famagusta through or more likely around Nicosia and including the Nicosia airport in the Turkish zone.

Resistance by UN and/or UK forces would not significantly affect this outcome, except possibly in the immediate environs of Famagusta.

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The Soviets would not be able to bring significant forces to bear in the Cyprus arena. They could alert or even move some of their forces in an effort to bring political and psychological pressures on Ankara.

The mainland Greeks would not be able to reinforce the island in a way that would affect the outcome. The Karamanlis government would probably survive while the Turkish operation was going on, but if the Turkish move was not reversed through either military or political action by the US or NATO, Karamanlis' chances of staying in power would be very small. Greek withdrawal from NATO would be likely in these circumstances.

If the Turks went for broader objectives (i.e., sought to impose military control over Cyprus as a whole or seal off all possible entry points), they could probably do it, against Greek Cypriot opposition, but it would probably take them several weeks, the operation would be bloody, and they would need reinforcements.

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The rough balance of forces on Cyprus at this time is as follows:

Ground 32,000 Turkish troops.

45,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard
and Greek mainland officers.



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4,400 United Nations.

Air Turkish air force (600 operationally
assigned aircraft) is available.

Greek air force (400 operationally
assigned aircraft) is not available;
its fighters are at the outer limits
of their combat ranges.



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Navy Turkish navy (100+ combat ships and
60 amphibious craft) is available
for operations with air cover.

Greek navy (60+ combat ships and 60-
odd amphibious craft) is unable to
operate successfully around Cyprus
for lack of effective air cover.

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REACTION IN CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE USSR

The Chinese Communists have been characteristically circumspect in what little they have said publicly about your administration. Chinese media promptly reported your speech of Monday night with its assurance of continuity in the US commitment to the principles of the Shanghai communiqué.

The Chinese news agency mentioned your assumption of office twice over the weekend:

--In a short item announcing President Nixon's resignation. (This item was broadcast on August 9 and published the next day on page six of the People's Daily.)

--In a two sentence account of your meeting last Saturday with the head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington.

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This is not to say that Chinese officials have been kept in the dark with regard to events of the past few weeks. [] they keep up [] through a restricted Chinese publication that carries international news and commentary drawn from foreign press sources. This is prepared for a selected readership in the party, government, and army. In May and June, for example--while the mainland press continued its embargo on news of Watergate--top officials were being kept informed through this publication.

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Japanese government spokesmen have publicly expressed confidence that US policy toward Japan will remain unchanged. Many Japanese are concerned, however, that under the new administration domestic problems will be emphasized at the expense of international affairs. Many leading Japanese feel that in the last few years the US has frequently slighted Japan's interests and has viewed the relationship in an increasingly competitive sense. Some probably feel that a shift to greater US attention to the domestic scene--particularly to economic problems--will result in both a growth in US trade protectionism and also pressure on Japan to assume a greater share of its defense burden.

(continued)

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Tokyo, in typical fashion, will scrutinize every statement of your administration for indications of what lies ahead for US-Japanese ties. When Foreign Minister Kimura travels to the US for the UN General Assembly session next month, he hopes to meet with you to get a clearer indication of the direction of US policy. Prime Minister Tanaka has also made it clear that he would like a meeting when he visits Canada and Mexico this fall.


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As for the Soviets, the change in administration is likely to have some impact on Brezhnev's own standing in the Politburo. His pre-eminence among his colleagues, which has grown steadily since 1970, when he first embarked on face-to-face summitry, has depended a good deal on the personal relationships he cultivated with President Nixon, President Pompidou, and Chancellor Brandt.

Thus far, Brezhnev has survived unruffled their successive departures from the international scene. He has now lost his special claim to these personal relationships, however, and his authoritative voice in Politburo discussions of foreign affairs may be weakened at least temporarily.

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SYRIA



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
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USSR-CHINA

Soviet officials, still concerned about the fate of the Soviet helicopter crew captured by the Chinese last March, were recently considering a new proposal to Peking to secure their release.



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Moscow undoubtedly is frustrated over its failure to secure release of the crew. The Chinese have not responded to formal protests and have rebuffed Soviet attempts to talk to the crew. The Peking press has been silent on the subject for several months, and Chinese officials have said only that the Soviets would be treated in accordance with "Chinese law."

Despite their irritation, the Soviets appear to have adopted a restrained approach since their last protest just before the US-Soviet summit.



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appear to have foresworn any bow to Soviet pressure on the incident. Furthermore, at a time of political uncertainty and contention in Peking, top leaders might be unwilling to accept responsibility for approving a proposal. Anti-Soviet credentials are particularly important for Chinese leaders at this time.

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The stone wall that the Soviets have encountered in trying to extract the helicopter crew is symptomatic of the present state of relations between China and the Soviet Union. Virtually everywhere the two are engaged, whether it be maneuvering

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on the diplomatic front or on border rivers, they are at loggerheads. The sensitive frontier dispute remains unresolved, and both sides admit openly that they expect nothing from the border talks, which have been going on in Peking for almost five years.

Sino-Soviet competition grew particularly intense--and took on a new dimension--three years ago, when the US moved to put itself in a better position to profit from the rivalry between the two Communist powers. This US policy prompted each to redouble efforts to outdistance the other in cultivating ties with Washington, and that competition is still on. As for their mutual relationship, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese expect any improvement, even in the unlikely event of wholesale leadership changes in Peking or Moscow. Each side seems convinced the other is locked into a hostile policy that will determine bilateral ties for a long time.


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
PANAMA-CUBA



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